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THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE
SAME: THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE IN
TEXAS
BONITA K. ROBERTS*
At a time when many employers are eliminating full-time jobs
and hiring part-time or temporary employees,' the issue of job se-
curity becomes increasingly important. While unionized workers'
collective bargaining agreements usually require just cause for dis-
charge, 2 nonunionized employees, the vast majority of the Ameri-
can workforce,3 are governed by the employment-at-will doctrine.
The basic tenet of the doctrine is that the employer can terminate
the relationship at any time, for any reason, including a bad reason,
as long as the reason is not illegal.4 Although the Texas Supreme
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. B.A., M.A., University of
New Orleans; J.D., Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans. Special thanks are due
to my able research assistant, Amy Martin, and to Kathleen Worthington for her secreta-
rial wizardry.
1. See Janice Castro, Disposable Workers, TIME, Mar. 23, 1993, at 43 (noting that large
companies increasingly utilize temporary workers in lieu of permanent employees). There
are approximately three times as many temporary employees today as there were ten years
ago. Id. While the number of people employed by Fortune 500 companies has dropped
from 19% to 10% of the workforce over the past two decades, more than 90% of the jobs
recently created are part-time. Id. at 44; see also William B. Gould, IV, The Employment
Relationship Under Siege: A Look at Recent Developments and Suggestions for Change, 22
STETSON L. REV. 15, 16-17 (1992) (noting increased number of part-time employees).
2. See Barry I. Mordsley & Steven R. Wall, The Dismissal of Employees Under the
Unfair Dismissal Law in the United Kingdom and Labor Arbitration Proceedings in the
United States: The Parameters of Reasonableness and Just Cause, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1,
10 (1983) (comparing methods for determining appropriate discharges).
3. See Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 135, 135 (1990) (stating that reduction in union workforce means higher volume
of at-will workers).
4. See East Line & Red River R.R. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888)
(reasoning that when neither party has expressed period for employment, either may ter-
minate at any time).
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Court recognizes one narrow exception to the doctrine' and the
state legislature has enacted a number of statutory protections for
workers,6 the doctrine basically remains intact.7 Because the Texas
Supreme Court is unlikely to abrogate the employment-at-will doc-
trine,8 rejection of the doctrine will fall upon the legislature. Such
a task may be made easier for the legislators by careful considera-
tion of both the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act passed
in Montana,9 the only state thus far to enact wrongful discharge
legislation, and the Model Employment Termination Act (META),
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Law.10 Described briefly below are common-law and
statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine recognized
in Texas, followed by an assessment of the Montana wrongful ter-
mination statute and the Model Act.
Although Texas courts recognize written contracts as a means of
modifying the employment-at-will doctrine, the specificity of con-
ditions required to effect a modification of the document is unset-
tled." The courts also are divided regarding whether oral
5. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (holding that only
exception applies to discharge for employee's refusal to perform illegal act carrying crimi-
nal penalties).
6. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(m) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (promulgating
employee protection from discharge because of wage garnishment for child support); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon 1992) (mandating employee protection
from termination for reporting nursing-home patient abuse); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-16a (Vernon Supp. 1993) (providing public employee protection from termination
for reporting illegal activities); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1993)
(requiring employee protection from discharge for filing workers' compensation claim).
7. See Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282,283 (Tex. 1993) (reason-
ing that employment-at-will prevailed as handbook expressly disclaimed contractual agree-
ment); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, 823 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991) (upholding
freedom to terminate when employment is at-will).
8. See Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d at 283 (affirming at-will doctrine).
9. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1992).
10. MODEL UNIF. EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT §§ 1-5 (1991).
11. See Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc. 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that agreement must limit employer's right to terminate "in
a meaningful and special way"); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (requiring written agreement to provide
specifically that employer may not discharge at will). But see Winograd v. Willis, 789
S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (finding no apparent
mandate for special language in written agreement beyond establishing term of employ-
ment's duration).
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employment contracts are enforceable, 2 although the Texas
Supreme Court may soon resolve this issue. The court has granted
a writ in a case to determine whether the employment-at-will doc-
trine can be orally modified to prohibit discharge except for good
cause. 13 Even among those decisions recognizing enforceability of
oral contracts, no consensus exists as to the circumstances that
would trigger the statute of frauds, thus precluding enforcement.
14
Less confusion exists, however, regarding employment handbooks
12. Compare Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310 (stating that employment agreement must
be in writing to be enforceable) and Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d
538,539 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (requiring written employment
contract in order to bring action for wrongful termination) and Stiver v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (requiring writ-
ing in order for employment contract to be enforceable) and Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406
(holding that in order to bring claim for wrongful termination, written employment con-
tract must exist) with Scott, 72 Tex. at 74, 10 S.W. at 104 (recognizing enforceability of oral
employment agreement) and Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 826
(Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied) (holding that employment agreement did not fall
within statute of frauds so as to require writing) and Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc., 709
S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (overturning summary judg-
ment because contract performable within one year is not required to be in writing) and
Hardison v. A.H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no
writ) (finding oral employment agreement to be enforceable).
13. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 670-71 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted).
14. See, e.g., Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775-76 (Tex. 1974) (finding
statute of frauds inapplicable when payment of annual bonus was based on oral agreement,
but calculated and paid after year's end); Portilla, 836 S.W.2d at 669-70 (refusing to apply
statute of frauds when employee was assured job security as long as her performance was
satisfactory); Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827 (refusing to apply statute of frauds to indefinite-
term oral employment contract); Kelley, 709 S.W.2d at 774 (reversing trial court's determi-
nation that statute of frauds applied); Hardison, 247 S.W.2d at 168-69 (rejecting application
of statute of frauds when contingency could happen within year). But see Schroeder v.
Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991) (holding that employee's own idea
that oral agreement would continue for eight years brought it within statute of frauds);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ
denied) (holding that statute of frauds applied to oral agreement that job was employee's,
for life if wanted, as long as performance was satisfactory); Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 128
(upholding summary judgment that barred claim based on oral assurances that good cause
was required to discharge employee); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d
175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (applying statute of frauds
when oral contract provided that employee would keep job as long as performance was
satisfactory). See generally JoAnne Ray & Victoria Phipps, Oral Contracts to Fire Only for
Good Cause: Are They Enforceable in Texas?, 56 TEX. B.J. 112, 116 (1993) (discussing lack
of uniformity in application of statute of frauds and suggesting that Texas Supreme Court
confront "tenuous distinctions and convoluted logic engendered by 300 years of statute of
frauds litigation").
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as a contractual exception to the employment-at-will doctrine be-
cause of a recent Texas Supreme Court ruling.15 In Federal Express
Corp. v. Dutschmann, the court held that a handbook promising
fair treatment in the form of post-termination review did not create
a contract requiring good cause for dismissal.' 6 The court reasoned
that the handbook expressly disclaimed that it was a contract and
stated that the review procedures were mere guidelines.' 7 While
the Fifth Circuit has been less than consistent in its treatment of
Texas law on the handbook issue, recent decisions have reached
results similar to Dutschmann.'8
The Texas Supreme Court also has refused to impose a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing upon the employment relationship.19
15. See Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d at 284 (holding that employment-at-will relationship
cannot be altered by employee handbook).
16. Id. at 283.
17. Id. Several state appellate courts have recently issued similar opinions. See, e.g.,
Almazan v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 840 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992,
writ denied) (stating that handbook containing disclaimers and statement that discharge
without cause was permissible did not create contract); Portilla, 836 S.W.2d at 669 (holding
that plaintiff was not bound by nepotism policy contained in handbook because no contract
was created by handbook); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Coop., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 664
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (noting that handbook delineating seniority
provision in regard to reduction in force did not create contract); Day & Zimmerman, Inc.
v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (rejecting conten-
tion that handbook providing for due and proper investigation prior to any disciplinary
action created contract prohibiting discharge without good cause).
18. See Crum v. American Airlines Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1991) (deciding
that limiting words included prior to descriptions of disciplinary procedure do not limit
employer's right to terminate at will); Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 463 (5th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (determining that detailed termination procedures included in per-
sonnel manual, absent showing that employer treated manual as anything more than guide-
lines, do not limit employment-at-will doctrine). Compare Zimmerman v. H.E. Butt
Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (finding that company rules
and regulations regarding discipline and discharge do not require termination only for
good cause), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991) with Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818
F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding employee contract based on handbook requir-
ing just cause dismissal).
19. See, e.g., Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d at 284 n.1 (finding that tort of breach of cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing may be found only in "special relationships," not in
employment relationships); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d at
724-25 n.2 (Tex. 1990) (relating holdings that have refused to imply duty of good faith into
employment-at-will contracts); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 n.1
(Tex. 1989) (refusing to address issue of good faith and fair dealing in employment con-
tracts), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). A covenant of good faith and fair
dealing imposes upon employers the requirement of good cause dismissal. Fortune v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-57 (Mass. 1977). As of 1989, Alaska, Con-
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As a result, discharged employees turn with increasing frequency
to traditional tort claims against employers. Courts have imposed
liability for fraudulent misrepresentation concerning terms and
conditions of employment.20 A number of Texas courts of appeals
have recognized claims for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress,21 but the Texas Supreme Court has declined to decide
whether the tort exists in the employment context.22 Further, the
necticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and California had recognized a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See generally EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL: A 1989
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (David A. Cathcart & Mark S. Dichter, eds.). California, how-
ever, limits recovery solely to contract damages. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 398 (Cal. 1988). Montana now requires good cause dismissal by statute. MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1992).
20. See, e.g., Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Tex. 1986) (holding
employer liable for refusing to pay employee promised bonus); United Transp. Union v.
Brown, 694 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that
employee was fired when employer breached promise of confidentiality); K.W.S. Mfg. Co.
v. McMahon, 565 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (relating
that employer promised employee 5% of corporation's stock but subsequently refused to
pay). In order to establish a cause of action, the plaintiff must show: (1) a material repre-
sentation was made; (2) the representation was false; (3) the representation was made
recklessly without knowledge of its falsity and made as an affirmative assertion or when
the defendant knew that it was false; (4) the defendant made it with the intention that the
plaintiff act on it; (5) the plaintiff acted in reliance on the representation; and (6) the
plaintiff suffered injury. See Levine v. Loma Corp., 661 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1983, no writ) (delineating requirements to assert fraud cause of action). See gener-
ally John H. Spurgin, II, Developments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge in Texas, 54 TEx.
B.J. 108, 110-11 (1991) (discussing tort of fraud).
21. See, e.g., Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1991, writ denied) (allowing claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Havens v.
Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990,
writ denied) (recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress as cause of action);
Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989) (finding that evidence
supported claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress), rev'd on other grounds, 803
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991). To show intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly, that the employer's
conduct was extreme and outrageous, that the actions caused the emotional distress of the
plaintiff, and that the emotional distress was severe. See Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
885 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming that under Texas law, supervisor's action in
placing stolen checks in plaintiff's purse, in order to implicate plaintiff, was extreme); Tide-
lands Auto Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (stating that Texas requires extreme and outrageous conduct to show intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
22. See Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mfg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 201-02 (Tex.
1992) (denying claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in employment con-
text). The court emphasized that an essential element of the tort is outrageous conduct
beyond a mere dispute between the employer and employee regarding the reason for ter-
mination. Id. at 202. In Twyman v. TWyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993), the Texas
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Texas Supreme Court has recently refused to recognize a separate
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in-
dependent of some other legal duty.23 Texas courts also have rec-
ognized defamation, including self-publication, 24 as a cause of
action in the employment context.2 5
The Texas Supreme Court has upheld an employee's right to pri-
vacy under the Texas Constitution 26 and under the common law, 7
although the common-law right to privacy has been narrowly con-
strued.28 Unresolved is whether an employee can state a claim
arising out of discharge for "false light" invasion of privacy.
Although the Fourth Court of Appeals has recognized this cause of
Supreme Court recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the
context of a marital dispute. Id. at 620.
23. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993) (holding that no general duty
to refrain from negligently inflicting emotional distress exists).
24. See, e.g., Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 442-47 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing defamation resulting from employer's verbally
publishing accusation of theft against subcontractor); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d
696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding that defamatory
matter communicated to defamed person can be considered publication if circumstances
facilitate likelihood that information will be communicated to third party).
25. E.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682 S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 617-18
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985).
26. The Texas Constitution has no express guarantee of a right to privacy, but the
supreme court has found "zones of privacy" similar to those provisions found in the United
States Constitution. Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987). In Employees Union, a public em-
ployer attempted to implement a mandatory polygraph-testing policy to monitor patient
abuse. The court could not find a state interest compelling enough to justify the use of
such an unreliable and intrusive means of monitoring patient abuse. Id. at 206. See gener-
ally Phillip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 97, 123-
25 (1988) (discussing drug testing and polygraphs).
27. See Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973) (delineating right to be
free from exploitation of one's personality, publication of private affairs when public has
no legitimate concern, and wrongful intrusion in private activities causing shame, mental
suffering, or humiliation).
28. See, e.g., Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1989, writ denied) (finding no invasion of privacy when urinalysis is done at
random and employee has ability to prohibit intrusion by refusing to consent even though
termination would result); Kmart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (recognizing that employee had expectation of privacy in
her locker only because she purchased lock herself), writ ref d n.r.e. per curiam, 686 S.W.2d
593 (Tex. 1985); Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, 42 Sw.
L.J. 97, 125-26 (1988) (discussing common-law right to privacy); John H. Spurgin, II, Devel-
opments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge in Texas, 54 TEX. B.J. 108, 112 (1991) (discuss-
ing right of privacy).
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action, the Texas Supreme Court remanded the case without ruling
on the issue, acknowledging, however, that false light is one of the
four usual categories of private actions for invasion of privacy.29
Torts allowing an employee to bring a wrongful discharge action
when that discharge violates a clear public mandate-usually in the
form of administrative rules and regulations, legislation, and judi-
cial decisions-fall into the category of public policy exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine. 30 The Texas Supreme Court cur-
rently recognizes only one such exception: an employee may bring
a wrongful termination suit against an employer who discharges
the employee solely for refusing to perform an illegal act for which
there are criminal penalties.31 This exception has been incre-
mentally extended to protect employees who make good-faith at-
tempts to determine whether the actions they have been directed
to perform are illegal.32 However, efforts to expand the public pol-
icy exception to include violations of law with only civil penalties
have failed thus far.33 The Texas Supreme Court identified a sec-
ond public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
that favors the integrity of pension plans.34 Although the court
ruled that an employer could be held liable for wrongful discharge
when an employee is terminated to avoid vesting of pension bene-
fits, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
ERISA preempts such an action.35 Therefore, the only public pol-
icy exception presently recognized in Texas is the action for wrong-
ful termination of an employee discharged for refusing to perform
a criminally illegal act.
29. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d at 200. The court refused to rule on the availability of assert-
ing a cause of action for "false light" invasion of privacy because the plaintiff did not sub-
mit an essential element of the claim, actual malice. Id. Critics vigorously attack the false-
light theory as inappropriate for the employment context. See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wen-
dell Hall, Employment and Labor Law: Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721,
1743 (1992) (asserting that false-light tort theory should not apply to employment cases).
30. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (explain-
ing legal basis for tort of wrongful discharge).
31. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735.
32. Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768,771 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1989, writ denied).
33. Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724-25.
34. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71.
35. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990).
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In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court rejected further efforts to cre-
ate another public policy exception when it refused to extend the
scope of the Texas Whistleblower Act to include protection for pri-
vate employees. 36 The court offered no explanation for its result,
but used the words "at this time on these facts. ' 37 That phrase,
along with Justice Doggett's detailed concurrence articulating the
elements necessary for a private employee to prove a wrongful dis-
charge for reporting illegal activity,38 has prompted suggestions
that legislation is a means of stemming the tide of litigation inevita-
ble to such a decision. 9
The whistleblower statute, unsuccessfully invoked in Winters v.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., ironically represents the one
area in which Texas law affords employees the broadest variety of
protection from wrongful discharge: legislation. Although general
whistleblower protection applies only to public employees,4 ° other
statutes cover private employees who report neglect or abuse of
nursing-home patients, 41 as well as employees who report viola-
tions of the Texas Commission of Human Rights Act,4 2 the Haz-
ardous Communications Act,43 or the Workers Compensation
Act."
Another group of statutes protects an employee discharged for
performing civic duties or fulfilling other legal obligations, includ-
ing an employee who complies with a valid subpoena in a civil,
criminal, legislative or administrative proceeding,45 a jury sum-
36. Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724-25.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 732-33 (Doggett, J., concurring, joined by Ray and Mauzy, JJ.).
39. See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law: Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 331, 388 (1991) (stating that Texas Legislature has better
opportunity than courts to analyze employment-law effects on commerce).
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a (Vernon Supp. 1993).
41. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon 1992).
42. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 5.05 (Vernon 1987). This statute prohib-
its discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, disability, religion, national
origin, age, or sex. Id. § 5.01. The 1993 legislative session enacted a number of revisions to
the statute, conforming to the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 12101, 12108 (West Supp. 1993), and the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. III 1991), most notably incorporating the caps on
damages. See generally Act of May 14, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 276, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 1287 (Vernon).
43. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 502.013 (Vernon 1992).
44. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1993).
45. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5207c (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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mons,46 military service,47 or court-ordered child support pay-
ment.48 An employer cannot discharge an employee who attends a
political convention,49 coerce an employee to vote a certain way,50
or refuse to permit an employee time off to vote.51 Nor can an
employer require union membership, 2 require testing for AIDS as
a condition of employment, 3 or coerce an employee to buy certain
merchandise.5 4 The most recently enacted legislation prohibits dis-
charge of an employee who participates in an emergency
evacuation.5
Even when considered simultaneously, the statutory and com-
mon-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine do not
swallow the rule. Instead, they constitute random, narrow efforts
affording employees few protections while requiring employers to
defend their decisions on a costly, piecemeal basis.5 6 The confused
status of the law on employment contracts, the potential expansion
of tort claims, and the incremental accumulation of statutes suggest
that comprehensive legislation designed to coordinate and system-
atize the law of discharge would benefit both employees and em-
ployers. During the last legislative session, one bill was proposed
to abrogate the employment-at-will doctrine under very narrow
circumstances. 7 Although the bill did not leave committee, it is
reasonable to expect that future proposals will draw heavily from
the features of a Montana statute enacted a few years ago,5 as well
as from the Model Employment Termination Act.59 While these
46. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1986).
47. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 431.005 (Vernon 1990).
48. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(m) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
49. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007 (Vernon 1986).
50. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 276.001 (Vernon 1986).
51. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 276.004 (Vernon 1986).
52. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5207a(2) (Vernon 1987).
53. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.102 (Vernon 1992).
54. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5196g (Vernon 1987).
55. Act of May 26, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 755, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2954
(Vernon).
56. Combined legal fees for both sides average more than amounts of recovery. See
Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
135, 141 n.35 (1990) (noting that average recovery by plaintiff was $188,520 and average
legal fees totaled $209,591).
57. An employer could not terminate an employee continuously employed by that
employer for at least ten years except for cause. Tex. H.B. 1328, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
58. MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1993).
59. MODEL UNIF. EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT §§ 1-5 (1991).
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provisions share a common effort to balance the interests of em-
ployees and employers, they differ in several important ways.
The Montana statute protects nonprobationary employees dis-
charged for refusing to violate or reporting a violation of public
policy,' although the statute does not define "probation." Public
policy is defined as a constitutional provision, statute, or adminis-
trative rule concerning public health, safety, or welfare. 61 An em-
ployer also violates the statute by ignoring the provisions of its own
written policy manual, or by lacking good cause for discharging an
employee.62 The good cause standard, as articulated in the statute,
is based broadly on "job-relatedness" and "legitimate business rea-
sons," but provides no examples of those terms beyond the em-
ployee's failure to perform job duties or disruption of the
employer's operation.63 Damages may be calculated for no more
than four years' worth of wages and fringe benefits from the date
of discharge, less any amount the employee earned or could have
earned in the interim.64 Apart from a limited provision permitting
punitive damages for certain discharges based on public policy, the
Montana statute preempts all other tort damages65 and contract
remedies66 and does not apply to collective bargaining agreements
or written employment contracts for a specific term.67
The Model Employment Termination Act differs from the Mon-
tana statute in several respects. Unlike the Montana law, META
defines covered employers and employees.68 The Model Act's
good cause definition is far more precise in its description, if not
broader in its effect.69 META eliminates all common-law claims
60. Mor. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1) (1993).
61. Id. § 39-2-903(7).
62. Id. § 39-2-904(3).
63. Id. § 39-2-903(5).
64. Mo Nr. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1993). A recent amendment requires a deduc-
tion from interim earnings for reasonable expenses involved in searching for, obtaining,
and relocating to new employment. 1993 MONT. LAWS ch. 442 (to be codified at MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1)).
65. MorT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(3) (1993).
66. Id. § 39-2-913.
67. Id. § 39-2-912(2).
68. MODEL UNIF. EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr § 1(1)-(2) (1991).
69. Id. § 1(4). Good cause is defined as follows:
(i) a reasonable basis related to an individual employee for termination of the em-
ployee's employment in view of relevant factors and circumstances, which may include
the employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct (on the job or otherwise), job perform-
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and damages.7" Recovery for lost wages and fringe benefits may be
awarded for no more than three years' worth of wages, reduced by
potential earnings and benefits accrued elsewhere. 71 Although
META, like the Montana statute, exempts collective bargaining
agreements and written contracts for a specific term,72 it affords
the employer and employee more flexibility to negotiate terms for
specific business-related performance standards. 73 Most signifi-
cantly, an employer and employee may mutually waive the good
cause requirement by written agreement that provides severance
pay equal to no less than one month's pay, up to a maximum of
thirty months' wages at the employee's pay rate in effect immedi-
ately prior to termination.74 Such an agreement constitutes a
waiver for both parties of the right to a civil trial.75
Enacting a Texas wrongful discharge statute, based on the better
defined and more flexible Model Act, merits serious consideration,
because the changes in the fluctuating state of employment law will
be more controlled through the legislative process.76 The Model
Act's broad definition of good cause discharge allows a business to
maintain reasonable control of its workforce within a predictable
framework. Should an employer voluntarily choose to waive the
statute, META's severance clause provisions provide a simple
means to calculate the cost of that option. While the severance
clause option seemingly constitutes an increased cost of doing busi-
ness, to the contrary, eliminating common-law causes of action and
damages reduces the risk of costly adjudication.77
ance, and employment record, or (ii) the exercise of business judgment in good faith
by the employer, including setting its economic or institutional goals and determining
methods to achieve those goals, organizing or reorganizing operations, discontinuing,
consolidating, or divesting operations or positions or parts of operations or positions,
determining the size of its work force and the nature of the positions filled by its work
force, and determining and changing standards of performance for positions.
Id.
70. Id. § 2(b).
71. Id. § 7(b)(3).
72. MODEL UNIF. EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr § 2(d) (1991).
73. Id. § 4(b).
74. Id. § 4(c).
75. Id.
76. Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law: Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 81, 138 (1990).
77. See Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42 HAS-
TINOS L.J. 135, 141 (1990) (approving deference to legislation rather than common-law
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Employees similarly benefit from a wrongful discharge statute's
recognition of a good cause discharge standard, amounting to the
philosophical rejection of the employment-at-will doctrine. Such
an abstract change, however, means little to the typical discharged
employee. More important is the enforcement mechanism in the
form of severance pay or lost wages. In that respect, META repre-
sents a tradeoff of the common-law causes of action and their at-
tendant damage awards, now available as a practical matter to a
very few employees, for smaller, predictable awards. 8 Ultimately,
then, a Texas wrongful discharge statute based on META's terms
could provide a workable and systematic improvement over the
current haphazard, yet expanding, scope of wrongful discharge law.
choice). A study of wrongful termination cases indicates that defense legal fees and ex-
penses averaged about $80,000 per case, the average net payment to successful plaintiffs
was $188,520, and average combined legal costs to both sides was over $200,000. Id. at 141
n.35.
78. The typical plaintiff recovers roughly one-half year's worth of severance pay. Id.
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